Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) that are being increasingly deployed in communities and public places provide a relatively stable routing infrastructure and can be used for diverse carrier-managed services. As a particular example we consider the scenario where a mobile device initially registered for the use with one wireless network (its home network) moves to the area covered by another network inside the same mesh. The goal is to establish a secure access to the home network using the infrastructure of the mesh.
Introduction and Motivation
The increasing deployment of wireless networks in urban areas set up in private households and in public places offers high potential for ubiquitous communication to mobile clients. A promising approach for combining the power of different wireless networks, possibly under distinct administrative control, while expanding their overall coverage area is the composition into a wireless mesh network (WMN) WMNs enjoy static topology with mostly stable routing infrastructure. This infrastructure allows for various carrier-managed services, which may also apply amongst wireless networks that compose the same mesh. One of them is the remote network access.
A typical urban WMN connects not only residential networks but also networks of institutions of public interest such as civil administration, police station, doctor's office/surgery, etc. Such networks (which we refer to as home networks) can be accessed by employees through the mobile devices initialized for this purpose while being in the proximity of the corresponding access points. On the other hand, it is desirable to allow remote access to these networks from locations covered by other wireless networks, which are still part of the same mesh. For example, doctors visiting patients at home or employees of a local health authority while inspecting restaurants in the neighborhood may wish to remotely access databases and application servers in their institutions in order to perform tasks that they would usually do within their native environment. Observe that these scenarios do not assume high mobility of the clients and the established WMN routing path will likely remain unchanged for the whole duration of the session.
An important security goal of a remote network access protocol is to protect the end-to-end communication between the device and its home network, in particular to protect the application content from being eavesdropped or modified during its transmission. Another significant problem in WMNs is that intermediate mesh routers are under different administrative control and that their cooperation is crucial for the establishment and maintenance of the remote session. A promising approach to increase this cooperation and so improve the robustness of the remote connection is to deploy additional incentive mechanisms [9], e.g. let the home network reimburse the cooperating mesh routers for resources that they allocate to establish and maintain the remote session. It is clear that traditional end-to-end security mechanisms (such as IPsec VPNs) that are transparent to the underlying routing infrastructure do not adequately reflect the additional security needs of cooperating mesh routers along the remote path.
Refining End-to-End Protection with the Concept of Path Security
With traditional authentication and key establishment protocols for end-to-end security the mobile device and its home network can compute the secret end-to-end key for the session after authenticating each other. This key is sufficient to protect the application data exchanged between the device and its remotely accessed home network.
Nevertheless, the communication nature of WMNs allows the adversary to inject packets into the wireless channel and although the deployed end-to-end protection will prevent the end points from accepting such rogue packets the cooperating mesh routers on the path will not be able to distinguish them from the "good" packets originated by the end points. As a consequence, mesh routers will forward rogue packets, thus wasting their own (costly) communication resources. This illustrates the need of stronger protection mechanisms that would ensure authentication at the packet level as well.
We observe that the above problem comes from the missing binding between the end-to-end protected (application) channel and the underlying multi-hop WMN channel. In this work we investigate how to efficiently bind these independent channels for
